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A Kantian Perspective on ·the·social ·Rate of Discount 
For an intertemporal choice rule based on discounting·to be accep­
table it must satisfy some properties of desirability. The purpose of 
this paper is twofold. First is that it.considers four such properties 
in the context of the Sen-Marglin-Lind social rate of discount [8, 7, 6,
9, 10]: intertemporal efficiency, intertemporal equity, intratemporal 
efficiency, and intratemporal equity. Second, it recasts the problem of 
intertemporal choice in the more general framework of intertemporal social 
choice, focusing primarily on the intertemporal equity aspects of the 
problem. In this paper the problem of intertemporal equity is viewed as 
the a0gregation problem in intertemporal social choice. In this context, 
intertemporal equity can be approached in terms of the axioms that define 
the aggregation rule F or of limitations to the feasibility set E, or a 
combination of both. 
Definition of the Social Rate of Discount. In the Sen-Marglin-Lind 
(SML) discussion a dichotomy arises between the private rate of discount 
and the social rate because there are externalities associated with the 
savings effort un·dertaken by members of the present generation. I bene­
fit from my contemplation of saving for the next generation, but I also 
benefit from my contemplation of the saving by each of the other members 
of the present. Likewise each of the others in the present benefit from 
the contemplation of saving by the rest. In the atomistic case, where 
there is no collective savin,gs rule and each saving decision is made in 
the absence of cooperative agreement among members of the present genera­
tion, there will be some saving. But in the case where a collective 
1 
savings rule can be agreed upon, each in the present will save a llu 
more, and all in the present will be better off.1 
The analysis is made considerably easier by positill g Jha� the 
world of equals in the present generation, with each Mr i linl the 
having the same utility function and the same resource rndowment. 
case various savings efforts can be put up for a majority Jul van: 
the most advantageous to one will be the most advantagebus to all J 
a collectively chosen savings effort can be agreed uponlunam
.
· ousll
the case where it is instfMfooally feasible to reach od e fore� 
ings effort of each Mr. i co.ndi ti oned upon the (same) e fort of eJ 
Mr. i, the social rate of discount is defined by 
1 + = b future ·consumption I P 6 present consumption utility Mr. i const�nt; collective savings ult 
In the case where it is not institutionally feasible to estal:llish 
collective savings rule, the private rate of discount is dlfilned lli 
1 + = 6 future consumption I  � 6 present consumption utility Mr. i constant; · no collective savings ! rt.Ile 
Defeat of the Lambda Rule of . Distribution 
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Following Sen, [9] each Mr. i attaches, at least dn the lmargfr�llwhere 
the decision is being made, a weight of 
1 per unit his own consumption today, 
a per unit consumption of others today, 
y per unit consumption by his heirs, and 
a per unit consumption by others in the next genejation 
As an institutionally chosen constraint, not under con rol of mem��is of
the present generation, A is the fraction of the savin s pro uct �� I Mr. 
i 's effort that goes to his heirs; the rest goes to ot�ersl i the II �ext 
2 
_!........_._...._, Jl_l!IU---� 
generation. N1 denotes the set of individuals belonging to the present 
generation; N2 denotes the next generation. There are N individuals in each:
In Sen [9] the savings problem is viewed as a game among the N 
members of the present generation. Without a collective savings rule, 
there is a Nash equilibrium, which is non-Pareto optimal. The purpose of 
the collective savfogs rule is to change the game into a cooperative one, 
which is Pareto optimal. However, it is also possible to view the matter 
as a game between the present generation and the next generation, as well. 
In this light the purpose of the collective rule of savings is to defeat 
the A rule of distribution. 
Consider a unit saved by i in the present generation, without a 
collective savings rule. The fraction. A of it goes to his heirs and 
(l-A)/ (N-1}_ goes to each of the others in the second generation. As long 
as a is less than y, (Mr. i values his heirs' consumption above others' 
in the future) individual i will prefer larger A to smaller A, (and he 
prefers most of all that A = 1 in which case his whole unit effort goes 
to his heirs). Under the collective rule of savings A of his unit goes 
to his heirs directly and (l-A)/ (N-1) to each other individual in the 
second generation. However, under the collective rule of saving, i's act 
of saving is tied to all others' saving in the first generation. For each 
of these others, (l-A)/ (N-1) goes to i's heirs. There are (N-1) others in 
the first generation saving, hence i's heirs pick up in total from savings 
other than i's equal to (N-1) (1-A)/ (N-1) or 1 - A. So the total effect of 
i's unit savi_ng, under the collective rule is A +  (1-A) going to his heirs. 
In other words the collective rule of savings guarantees that a unit saving 
from i in the present generation results in a unit going to i's heirs no 
matter what the A rule of distribution. The situation is symmetric for all 
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the individuals in the present. As far as each member or t1e f, ics1 
eration is concerned, his unit saving effort is translated oy he cl1 
tive·savings rule into a unit consumption for his heirs. Tile rul l 
distribution is defeated. 
But the purpose of the collective rule of saving is mole f han r 
. defeat the A rule of distribution solely. To develop th is Ide , w1rlll Mr. i's utility.function, with no essential loss of generality to ti I 
discussion: 
U. = C. + B •EC. + y •EC .. + a• E E C.k 1 1 . j;!i J j lJ jfi k J 
where Ci is individual i's own consumption, in the present 
Cj is individual j's own consumption, in the prjsent 
n-
ec-
f 
SML 
( 3) 
cij is the consumption of i's heirs coming fr m in ividu'�l j's investment I j And to dose the model e<plidtly we focthec spedf '1 '"'' l l1Hitiol 
ti on: 
K. = f(S.) 1 l 
where K. is the investment product available for consump ion i[�llthe 1 second generation, from i's saving in the pre�e t gert�Ha-
s �
ion
th · f · d' "d 1 · · th t i · J i. 1s e savrngs o rn 1v1 ua 1 rn e pres,en g nerau11tin 
S; +Ci = K, all i. 
Without a collective savings rule individual i acts! to 
max u. = c. + S • E C. + yE c .. +a E EC. 
c. 1 1 jfi J j lJ jfi k J 1 
subject to: 
C .. = Af (K-C.) 11 1 
C .. = (l-A)f(K-C.)/ (N-1), j;!l 
Jl 1 
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Thus each Mr. i in the present geneation sets 
1 · .  - f' . t..y+{l-;>.) (J. - ' 
or the marginal efficiency of capital to the private rate of discount, 
(2). 
(4) 
With a collective savings rule individual i acts to maximize the 
same utility function, again over Ci' but over different, institutionally 
determined constraints; namely, 
� Cij = f (K-Ci) (defeat of t.. rule) J 
E E C.k = (N-l)f (K-C1.) j;!i k J 
E C. = (N-1) C. J . 1 j;!i 
Thus each Mr. i in the present generation sets 
1 + (N.;.l)a _ f' y + (N-l)a -
or f' equal to (1).
Note that in the "normal" case y > a, and when a/a > y
l + w = 1 > ! > 1 +·(N-l)a = l +/..y + (1-N)a - y y + (N-l)a P 
(5) 
So even if � were initially set equal to 1, so that there were no 
need to defeat the t.. rule of distribution and 1 + w equalled l/y, the 
private rate would still be greater than·the social rate and there would 
still be an incentive to have a collective savings rule. The case where 
. t.. = 1 and a/a = y is where all one's inheritance goes to one's heirs and 
there are "balanced emotions." In this case there is no incentive for 
those in the present generation to institute a collective savings rule 
and p = w. In the case where a/a = y but_ t.. < 1, the only reason for 
instituting a collective saving rule is to defeat the t.. rule of distribution. 
5 
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Consideration Set I Definition: The consideration set is the set of individu ls 01· 
which Pareto comparisons are made. j Note that the consideration set for the SML social 
l
ate o dis���nt 
is the present generation (N1 ). Preference structures h ve lbe n es� .. -
1 i shed only for the members of this. generation. 
·rntratemporal Efficiency of the.SRO
The allocation associated with a collective savings l rulle ,bnd a11 1sav-
ings effort defined by equating the social rate of disco1!mt to f' i. 
Pareto optimal over the consideration set N1 • This resullt is lrea� 
established 1n [B, 7, 6]. Of course there are many Pare o opt"mal l�uo­
cations, each one associated with a redistribution of the i1it ·a1 J��l:lw­
ment K. Even with differing wealth positions there will still be Jill.hi-. I I mous agreement on the level of f' but the actual savings will iffenlll rrom 1nd1v1dual to 1nd1vidual with the differing end-.ents a tel t ans�llf (una­
nimity preserved because the utility functions are linear in K,,. 
}!itertemporal Inefficiency of the SRO 
Because the considerat1on set for the SHL soc1al ra e Of isc1�11 not N, U N,, this notion of a discount rate is not one o i jte t,� I ficiency. The optimality of this rate of discount is de inJd ·n tel 
the.Pareto optimality over N1 • Thus it is possible to d fi1e refJ
structum for N, a�d N, such that there is '" intertempbral c nfl11� ofinterest, which, with the existence of certain institutibnsJ c uld j 
resolved to the mutual advantage of both generations. I 
so far the .collective rule of saving has defeated tre 1 r le 01 tribution costlessly, at the same time achieving resolutl'on of the I
ltial intratemporal inefficiency Of "unbalanced emotions, 10 nf"'llC: 
potential conflict of interest across generations, consi er la 
is 
1 ef-
of 
ce 
is-
en-
the 
case 
6 
of balanced emotions, where a = s = 0. In this case the sole purpose of 
the collective rule of saving is to defeat the A rule of distribution. In 
order to generate an intertemporal conflict of interest, the utility fUnc..:. .. 
. tion of each i E. N1 is modified so that defeat of the A rule of distribu-
tion comes at a cost to those in the first generation. We assume that it 
means more to Mr. i that his heirs receive a unit of consumption from his 
own savings effort than from a unit from someone else's saving effort. 
Blood lines count for Mr. i, and in fact blood donation may be a practical 
example. It appears that many people receive more satisfaction in their 
relatives receiving their own blood rather than an equal amount of others' 
blood. Let the utility of each Mr. i in the first generation be 
U.1 = C. + yC .. +yo E C .. where 0 < o < 1 1 1 11 j11 1J - - (6) 
Because the preferences of members of the second generation have so far 
been left entirely unspecified, we have complete freedom in defining their 
preferences in such a way that might generate a conflict of interest 
between generations and consequently intertemporal inefficiency. Such a 
conflict can arise in a very simple manner. Suppose that members of the 
second generation have a weak preference toward egalitarianism. If they 
were completely egalitarian they would insist on A = l/N, but all we need 
is a weak preference for A to be less than 1. As a second divergence of 
preference, each individual of the second generation does not care whether 
he consumes one type of consumption good or another, the sum total of the 
consumption goods is all that matters to him. We can specify the utility 
function of each members of the second generation as follows: 
Ui2 = � Cij - (A-.5)2/1000J (7) 
Members of generation one control the saving-investment decision and the 
institutional constraint of whether or not there is collective saving. 
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Members of generation two control the institutional 
the A rule of distribution. Now.we are ready to 
of Pareto optimality, this time for the consideration 
identify three cases. 
Case 1. No collective savi.ngs rule available to 
generation two controls A. In case 1 each Mr. i of 
maximizes (6} over Ci subject to 
C.. = Af( K-C. } , 11 . 1 
leading to the first order condition 
fl = .l ' . . AY 
And the representative individual in. generation two 
the result that generation two unanimously chooses. 
Case 2. Collective savings rule available, 
A. In case 2 each Mr. i of the first generation 
ject to 
C .. = :>.f(K-C.)11 . 1 
cij (l-A}f(K-C.)/ (N-1) J 
Cj = Ci, 
leadi.ng to the first order condition 
f' - 1 y>. + (1->-ho 
and again generation two chooses A = 0.5. 
Case 3. Generation two gives up the 'A rule of 
A = 1. In this case there is no advantage to either no�o��rinn 
whether or not the collective rule of savings is avai 
first generation maximizes l6) over c. subject to . 1 
Cii = f(K-Ci) 
8 
ion 
e 
(8) 
with 
ols 
i sub-
(9) 
sets 
r two, 
the 
with the resulting first order condition 
f I = .!.,y (10) 
We can call (101 an intertemporal rate of discount, because it is based 
upon the preferences of both generations, taken together. With O<t.<l and 
O�o�l, we have 
1 1 . 1 
l.y � l.y + (1->.)yo � y . . 
private rate social rate intertemporalrate 
It is easy to check that the intertemporal rate of discount can lead to 
allocations which Pareto dominate both the private rate of discount and to 
the social rate of discount. To see this we can take the numerical 
example: 
f(S) = 7S - (l/2)S2
y = 1/2 
K = 17 
0 = 1/3, 
(and.>. = 1/2, case 1 and case 2; >. = 1, case 3).
f1 (to be equated with the discount ratel 
Saving by Mr. i, present generation 
Utility, each Mr. i present generation 
Utility, each Mr. i future generation 
TABLE 1
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Case 1 Case 2 ·private· Social 
4 3 
3 4 
19.5 19.7 
16.5 20.0 
Case 3 Intertemporal 
2 
5 
23.3 
22.5 
I I 
In the numerical example the social rate of discou t (B..: =2) i 
l , .1 I  • 11 smaller than the private rate of discount (4-1=3), and he al ocatt for the entire community of present and future, under t e sf cial r��� of
discount (associated with collective savings) Pareto do inatesl the ll�rnlo­
cation under the private rate of discount (without colle titelavi1��) .  
However, the inter.temporal rate of discount (2-1=1) is i t�r smal1111ar 
than the social rate and its implied allocation Pareto d. mi�a s t�:s111one 
under the social rate. 
In order to promote the kind of intertemporal efficren<±y' ·ust 
II cussed there need to be institutions which lead to the wrshJs f thelllbast 
being honored and the needs of the future anticipated. lhe pr senJ l ll'Ahder­
takes some action to the be"'fit of the future on the fa]th th t t+,,u­
ture will change its behavior because of the action. Traditio s ofrllllllm­
mon law, the law of wastes, contract law, and legislatiJ adf,ts l havellll!he 
essential purpose of bridging time. Contracts can only Je sig ed aol . 
I I agreed upon by members of the sameinstant,.but the. purpor o contittkt 
is to change future behavior on the basis of present act on. f th! 
were no faith in the inter.temporal "momentum" associated with ontr�m�s, 
there would be no usefulness to them. Thus a number of instl·t tion� om 
be analyzed (and some of them justified) on the basis of how t ey ml1,1111or 
may not promote intertemporal efficiency. 
Intertemporal Equity and·the ·sRD 
f. 
I 
. 
"Equity" is a relatively undefined term, suggesting iffe
. 
ent Jn�lllgs 
to different people, and "intertemporal equity" is per.hap eJen vagJI 
Howe•er, as a start we may say that intertemporal equ1ty rs �e "fail 
resolution of con fl kts of interest across time. This does 1ot appeiilil to
get us anywhere, pecause "fair" is still undefined, but i{ h�lp . F� ltt�t 
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of all, to have a problem of intertemporal equity, there needs to be a con­
flict of interest. If some of the interests are left out of consideration 
altogether, then there can be no "fair" balancing of interests and hence 
no satisfaction of a concept of intertemporal equity, no matter what the 
definition of "fair." In defining and applying the SML social rate of 
discount, the interests of those in N2 are not defined and bro.ught into 
the analysis. Thus this notion of a social rate of discount is independ­
ent of a concept of intertemporal equity. 
Although people differ as to what they think is "fair," they often 
agree on specific examples that they think are "unfair. " Thus to illus­
trate the independence between the notions of the SRD and intertemporal 
equity, we may look for an example in which application of the SRD leads 
to an allocation inconsistent with "almost anyone's" sense of fairness. 
To do so it is not necessary to look for conflicts of interest in which 
both generations gain by their resolution; ip a sense efficiency increas­
ing resolutions are not resolutions of conflicts at all, but simple horse 
trading. We go back to (3) and look at the case where 
a = o.a 
y = 0.25 
a = 0 
;\ = 1 
K = 17 
N > 1. 
This time suppose that there are not just two but many possible genera­
tions, each with population N and with the same utility function (3) for 
each individual in each generation. With respect to the preference 
structures we are in an intertemporal world of equals. However, some 
11 
I 
generations have the advantage (or disadvantage) of beinglborn' arlillliilthan 
others, so that the use of the original resource base NK ay no app��t to
some generatio"', or to the atemporal observer. ' I If no collusive, cooperative agreement is allowed am ng [th membii!rs of
a single generation then (2) applies and it is easily che ked t at t��lpath 
of consumption grows from 14 percapita in the first gener tidn, o 14 11 1�h in
the next, from whence it remains forevermore constant (thl edo� my is11111>er-
I . II manently sustainable at 14 1/2 consumption percapita). Btlt if
. 
colr l l:!l:tive 
'"le of savings is allowed, percapit• consumption is 17 + T' firs�lhen­eration, there is no saving, and there is zero consumptioj for 11 t! 
other generations. The first generation did not create of eJn its b� .. -
ginal endowment of NK. In a sense this resource base is the l11c mmonll l Heri­
tage of a 1 1  generations," and the first genera ti on happenJ td[ bl i tsll Mi rsttrustee, by virtue of being born first -- by the happenstJnce o timel �ll To
the atemporal observer this "unnecessary" running down of thJ· r sour�IEllbase 
appears intertemporall y  inequitable. (It should be noted thJt ppli�l!ltion 
of the SML social rate of discount does not usually lead o f c perll mtse 
allocations compared with the private rate of discount. Indeed
. 
this �btion 
of a social rate of discount appears to have been developld in. rder, encourage greater investment in underdeveloped countries, jfo1 t e belii!rit 
of t;e fotu,.., not to its expense. The point here is tha tj" is hmthing 
in this concept of a social rate of discount to guarantee the p eser,mlion 
of the resource base, and this obse,,ation applies os wel t, o her k.,.,_ 
cepts of the discount rate based on the present's sense ot ti�e pref���nce.) 
Intratemporal Equity and the SRD 
The present impasse in the development of energy pol 
large part from disagreements about intratemporal equity 
12 
re�wlts 
who l in t 
present should bear the burden of conservation, and how the impact of 
higher prices can be softened for those least able to pay. Regional dis­
putes over heati_ng oil for the northeast, diesel fuel for the midwest and 
gasoli ne everywhere have slowed the development of common policy. 
" Intratemporal equity" can be taken to mean the "fair" resolution of 
conflicts of interest among members of a single generation. Because of 
the posited world of equals in the SML social rate of discount, 
unanimous decisionmaking is possible and there is no conflict of interest 
over a collective decision on the savings effort (f') for each individual. 
Although unanimity remains when the initial endowment is made to vary 
among individuals, unanimity is lost if a, f3 and y are made to vary as 
well. With differing a, f3 and y, people will have differing opinions as 
to the optimum collectively chosen savings effort (or efforts) . There is 
no easy resolution of this conflict of interest over the level of savings 
effort. 
For the case of differing a, f3 and y among individuals of the same 
generation, Sen [10] suggests weighting the benefits of each group (or 
individual in the present generation). Each possible set of weights 
amounts to the selection of one Pareto optimal allocation, over the consi­
deration set N1, from the infinitely many possible Pareto optimal alloca­
tions (al so over N1}. In other words setti_ng the weights amounts to sol v­
ing the problem of intratemporal equity. If we had the set of weights we 
could define the social rate of discount. But the SML social rate of dis­
count gives no insight as to how the weights, or some other scheme of 
aggregation could be chosen. Thus this notion of the social rate of dis­
count does not include a concept of intratemporal equity. 
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I Of the four properties of social desirability -- i�terfe porall ffi-
ral 
ans-
gets-
ci enoy, fotertempora 1 equity, intra tempora 1 efficiency td I n rat, equity -- we wo
.
uldn<>t expect a sfogle cOnoept of the dij'°unt rate l 1 · 
lated into a single number to satisfy all four. There Joul1 e a i and-instruments problem. This is the "discount rate problj," -- tl 
s1 ngl e conoept, sped fied as a single number, cannot sa�isf1 everl 
simultaneously (see Baumol [2]). Before analysis, we might l e pect lrn 
concept of the social rate of discount might lead toward a co. bina1lill:ln of 
the four. But we have seen that the SML notion is preciselt efin�dll in 
terms of intratempor.al efficiency, and is conceptually i debendent 
a 
goals 
at a 
the 
other three. l ffi-In order to bring the desirability properties of inrer e poral 
cienoy and intertemporal equity into a common framework of l1 msif, the
notation of social choice is used below. But refocusing thk iscoJ �� rate
I I problem this way comes at a price of its own. We assume belo tha1ll llltfhe 
intratemporal choice problem has been "solved." Each ge erJti n ad l�l­
a single unit and we drop our concern for the intratempo al las ectJ 11J 
decision problem in favor of the intertemporal. 
Intertemporal Social ·choice 
Let xt be a description of the conditions under which gen ratil 
1 i ves and x - (x1, x2, • • •  , xt, . • .  ) be the state of the wofl l djfr m no[[The collection of feasible states is E = (E1,E2, . . .  ), wh re Et is t of feasible options for generation t. Clearly a choice f t t till constrain the. generatiooal opportunity sets fr"' t on. Rt js "'"ii specifying the preference structure of generation t. We often thinl 
generation as. the lifetime of an individual, and generat
J
ons[
I 
a ove\ 
But for this dismsion we m think of a genecation as sr e yel 
erations not overlapping, but a single individual belong�ng �o a nu� 
14 
like 
the 
t 
n. 
set 
t may 
rder 
pping. 
. gen­
r of 
generations. The intertemporal social choice problem is to select an 
aggregation rule F 
F: (R1 ,_R2, • • •  ,Rt, • . .  )+R 
Must the first generation (the present generation) be an intertemporal 
dictator? In some ultimate, de facto sense, the first generation is a dic­
tator, because there is no other genration in existence to help make the 
choice. However, the first generation need not be a dictator in the Arrow 
sense. 2 This possi,bility result is a direct corollary of the theorem by Hansson (see [4] for discussion) which states that when there are an infi­
nite number of voters the Arrow axioms of Pareto, Irrelevant Alternatives, 
and Transitivity are consistent with an infinite number of social choice 
aggregation rules that are non-dictatorial. All that needs to be done to 
establish this corollary is to interpret the voters as generations. 
On what basis is F to be chosen? The selection of F can be viewed as 
the problem of intertemporal equity, in which the specific and potentially 
conflicting interests of the individual generations, described by the Ri, 
are harmonized.and resolved into the single intertemporal preference order 
R. It is possible to select F, not in terms of the specific interests of 
the first generation or any other generation, but in terms of the appeal 
of the axioms that define F. Going further, in the Kantian tradition de­
fining a just or fair rule depends upon first setting aside one's own 
specific interests in the matter. The appeal of the Arrow axioms is not 
in how they make a particular voter better or worse off in a particular 
situation but in their symmetry in dealing with the arbitrarily defined 
general profile of voter interests. By choosing the Arrow axioms, or 
other axioms, it is possible to define F without knowing the specific 
interests of specific generations. Kant would say that in trying to 
select a fair or just F, it is better not to know the specific interests 
of one's own generation. One does not need to know the specific interests 
15 
of the other. generations either -- both being necessary! fo� al util rian 
approach. For the Kantian tradition, in trying to specffY ta pust 1��pe, 
to take into account what one gains or loses by the rul� i!:i tb poi��h the
process of selection. 
Putting the matter another way, in the Rawlsian vetsiJn f t�rlsl tra­
dition, '" ; ntoctempoca lly fa fr '"le 1 s one thot would e jho en ;rib 1 1  
the generations were present in an original position unter a eil �m ig­
norance as to their specific interests (see [2]). At t e abs ractf ll�kvel, 
we may ask what would be the F implied if the represent tiJes in J� .
intertemporal original position considered the Arrow ax ·oml. As ,i�• ;n 
Ferejohn and Page [4], these axioms in the intertempora slt ng i �ly a 
class of social choice rules which all embrace some of the Ip perJ �s of 
majority rule voting. Unfortunately such social choice rules are t�IJtongly 
time asymmetric, because all the infinite majorities li ii he asl��ototic 
future. Under a veil of ignorance, in which each gener ti0n kloes IJV�<Jt know 
its place in time, this situation might seem unfair. N neih lessJl ll�ome of
the character of this type of rule might be attractive l�o {h e i� l llltfhe 
original position. For example, they might find attractbJ a "f+ue 
version" of th;s rule wh;ch says that H the present ge e.Jt; n pf "'1ers '
to y, but H the forseeable future -- the next foe or 
I 
e+ era�""'s 
realistically -- prefer y to x, then x should not be chose!. NotJl llltfhat at
the level of selection of the rule, no generation knows l its o m ij'1!Eirest 
as no generation knows its place in time, so that specit�ic if ereJttllSI are
irrelevant to the process of selecting the rule. But o ce s ectJ<ll�I the
application of the rule depends upon
. 
tryi.ng to calculat the inte��IS!ts ofthe various generations. 
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This "finite version" rule has application to situations where there 
are potentially long term irreversibilities, such as release of long lived 
radioactive wastes and chemjcal mut.agens. We may not know the future's 
preference structure in detail, but we can be reasonably certain that they 
prefer less cancer to more. This last observation does not mean that the 
rule would imply that there be no nuclear power plants or that unlimited 
safety should be built into any that are built. There are other benefits 
associated with a nuclear program, and there comes a point in a safety 
program where.the future benefits more from resources expended in other 
activities than in additional safety. But this "finite version" rule is 
indeed different from a discount rule as an intertemporal social choice 
mechanism, and tends to be more cautious toward irreversible harm. 
Should the intertemporal social choice rule F be defined to be a dis­
count rate rule? Notationally should we require 
xRy <=<>EB i-l U (xi) > E oi-l U (y.) for some fixed o i=l -i=l 1 between 0 and 1?
The usual reason for advocating a discount rule to be the intertemporal 
choice rule is that it is intertemporally efficient. As we have seen, 
where there are intratemporal externalities the private rate of discount 
may not be intratemporally efficient, and where there are intertemporal 
externalities the social rate may not be efficient. The usual argument 
about the intertemporal efficiency of a di.scount rate rule assumes away 
these kinds of externalities and focuses on the efficient mix of a several 
good economy, where the goods may have different marginal productivities 
at different levels of use [3, 5, 1]. In such situations a discount rate 
based on the opportunity cost of capital, allocated over the production of 
several goods, is needed to rule out intertemporally inefficient paths. 
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I However, if we consider the alternative collection 01 rule imprnled 
by the Arrow axiom,, each of the'e are intertemporally eTcr too� because Pareto is one of the axioms. Thus if efficiency r o
1
ur only ll ltil!m­
cern, we have no basis upon which to choose between the ilter
l
te poral llllvot­ing type of rule and the discount rule. The two types of rules are � -
ferent and can rank alternative decisions differently, so we In� d tol l lUok 
at the matter a little further. 
The first thing to note is that even if we refuse to l ac,ept thellM:IUs­count rule as the intertemporal choice aggregation rule, discou ting 
not abandoned altogether. Indeed it is 
.
al ready embedded J t Jwo othe 
1eve1' of the choice problem. A di"o""ti"g co"cept fo + F of 11 
opportunity cost of capital helps define the intertemporal feas bilif�lset E. And a discounting concept in the form of time prefereraceJ o e fo�llleach 
generation, is embedded in the preference ordering Ri for eaJh. ene)il iron 
( eoch ge"era ti o" h., prefere"ce ordering' ovor the e"ti re pa Jh x,, II ... I
aod "ot j "'t over a lteroa ti ve '"'''hob; of "' o>m parti c 1 a1 t ·me JI j 
Having al ready two roles in the i ntertempora l social cho i be agg ega J� I \ i · '· 
problem, requiring the third may be a bit greedy. 
The second thing to note is that one of the necessar p1op rtieslllbf a 
discount rate rule, as the intertemporal aggregation rule f is s atiJ��fity. 
A' 'how" i" [4] th1' property, i" the co"text of the Arrt alio '· J�b h"
a ,tro"g time .,_etry. Addi"g ,tatiooar1ty to the Arri alio ' "J�11�nly forces the aggregation rule to be dictatorial, but also p1ckJ o t tJ� �irst 
generation to be the dictator. Thus in adding stationarik Jo he Jl'!lll'llw 
axioms we lose the Kantian concept of fairness. I j It is unlikely that there will be a universally agrer pot not!nloh of
intertemporal equity or of the means to satisfy the notion. ITh siJUEHtion 
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intertemporally is a little like the debate over the progressive income 
tax intratemporally. Different people have different ideas as to how pro­
gressive the income tax should be, .and in part these di"fferences rest upon 
different ideas about intratemporal equity. There is a continuing debate 
and the actual level of progressivity results from the political outcome 
of the debate. The usefulness of an analytical discussion is mainly to 
provide a more explicit framework for the debate. In this spirit we can 
identify two possible directions toward which a concern for intertemporal 
equity could lead. 
(1) Speaking loosely, the Arrow axioms by themselves and stationarity 
plus the Arrow axioms span the time space, with the Arrow axioms 
giving decision power to the asymptotic future and the Arrow 
axioms plus stationarity giving decision power to the present. 
It would be useful to investigate other axiom systems that are 
not so time asymmetric in either direction. 
(2) Another approach would be to restrain the domain set for the Ri 
or restrain the feasibility set E, ruling out certain choice 
alternatives as a matter of intertemporal equity before choosing. 
F. One of the traditional ways of dealing with the Arrow para­
dox is to constrain the domain set. Alternatively if certain 
alternative paths are ruled out from the beginning, like collapse 
of the resource base, then discount rate choice rules may be more 
acceptable on equity grounds. 
Stiglitz [11] has suggested that if we are interested in improving 
the lot of the future, on the grounds of equity, then we should use gen­
eralized instruments like lowering the market rate of discount to do so. 
However a couple of questions arise here. The market rate of discount 
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sorm several fuootions intratemporall.v and traditlonallt m,nj ula�I of the rate has been under.taken for the purposes of contro!l i ng · nfl al 
t ion, rel i eving unemployment, and contro 111 ng the i nterna loJa l fl oj 
'"rrenci.,. J"'t in the short term, intratemporal settfog t,er fa • 
targets-and-instruments problem in whkh manipulatlon of jn'['i t r� 
is unable to do all desirable things simultaneously. Sel!:ond, ' 'f in] 
est rates were loweced, for the purpose of benefitting th! fjtu e, i� '"' 
Mt clear that the future would in fact benefit. With ce!peot o I energy, the problem facing the future is that as present �updli s bedDme 
1depleted there is the risk that future substitutes will n�t Je evel��ed 
in a timely fashion. A main purpose of conservation is t� rJli ve t� 
risk burden, by buvfog time [a sec°"d purpose is intratemlo+
. 
- toll 
relieve our short term dependence on foreign suppliers ). Otller probr l!!ms 
facing the future have to do with populatlon growth, depletiJn f so/ 
heat limits to the dissipation of energy consumption on a wo�ld ide 1��le, 
and so on. It is possible that stimulating investment ge,erJ11 wil 
intensity rather than ameliorate these problems. It is c9ncJiv!ble fHht 
subsidy of the profit rates for synthetic fuels, along wi!h ,th r su� ldy 
of interest rates, for example, could lead to situations 11he�e 0 BTilis1are 
spent trying to recover 9. 
As an alternative we can face the intertemporal equiy piro�lem 
directly by specifying targets of what we would like the 1es°lr e bar lto 
look like, as a matter of equity, 25, 50, and 100 years f1om no . T�ste is both a normative and a practical reason for focusing s. ec+i ally 1 1 � the resource base rather than something more general such as lh weal � 
position of succeeding generations. We did not earn or c
J
eate he I resource base we inherited, we were born into it. Locke oul� ay tti11111 we
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acquire just ownership over that part of the resource base which we mix 
our labor with, and appropriate from the commons. But at the time of 
Locke, the commons was sufficiently large so that appropriating one part 
of it still left more for others. The situation with respect to energy 
and some other natural resources is now different. If our claim to the 
ownership of the natural resources is based upon the happenstance of 
time -- that we are born earlier than following generations and that 
previous generations did not have the technological power to destroy the. 
resource base in their own time -- then this claim is pretty thin. How­
ever, if we use the resource base in usufruct, replenishing it through 
substitutes and the return to renewable resources as we deplete the non­
renewable ones, then our claim to the man-made capital and other wealth 
gained from mixi.ng our labor with the services in usufruct of the inher­ited resource base appears much stro.nger. Our obligations to the future. 
have to do with the means of survival, with the resource base which we 
inherited, rather than with the fruits of our efforts. 
Intratemporally, at a normative level, we may wish to guarantee that 
no one starves, that anyone is entitled to a reasonable opportunity of 
education, basic medical care, and l.egal counsel before the court. But 
we may at the same time feel no obl.igation to guarantee everyone the same 
wealth, education, health, or chance of winning in court. Our idea of 
equity can extend to certain opportunities but not so far as to guarantee 
the results of these opportunities. And so it is across generational 
time. We can feel the obligation to guarantee the means of survival by 
preservi.ng the capacity of the resource base, but we may not feel the 
obligation to guarantee a specific wealth position for the future. 
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As a practical matter, it is much easier to provide fo1 c 
opportunities than it is to insure their results. We do not know 
detail the preference of the future and we do not know hlw Jel
hard those in the fot"'e will work. We have little oont l ol h actual levels of utility. But we do have a la.rge measure 01 c ntrol. 
over the adequacy of the resourc
.
e base which they will ilnl he1it We i 
ambiguously increase conservation and the payoff to subs itute by I 
Ming a system of tam oo the extraction of v1 rg1o ma teri J1 s aod i 
lower the risk that sobstitute technologies will not applar to repll depleted resources by investfog directly in the substitule tee nolo! 
We affect the adequancy of the resource base by our population poli' Our choice of x, in the preseot affects the ( E, ,E,. ... ) ]" the futui 
In optimal control problems, choosing the terminal stodk s ofi 
1 ooked upon as an embarassment. Usually the functional �ei Jg • axim 
is some sort of present value, and the discount rate inJ1vJd. ere I! 
no clue as to how to e"luote the terminal stock, whose lalJe s dell 
mined "beyond the terminal date. " For this reason many anal�s s pur J .Ithe terminal date to infinity where it does not matter. Ho ev r, ti 
above analysis suggests that doing so puts out of consideraJio thel 
interesting part of the choice problem. We can view the prJbl m 01 
ing the terminal stock as the problem of choosing an intertJmp rall1 
target. There need not be just one target at the end bt th plall 
period, but several targets, or check points along the wly. T ese i 
can be thought· of as requirements of res.ource adequacy aj on] t e coil path. If these targets are to be reached along the way, and i the 
thought to be intertemporally equitable, then the object,onsl t 
count rule as the intertemporal choice rule largely disa11peatr. 
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Footnotes 
1As noted by Sen [9] a collective savi_ngs rule does not imply greater 
savings effort. We make use of this non-implication below. 
2rn the Arrow.sense, the first generation is a dictator if generation 
one's preference of x to y implies the intertemporal social preference of ' 
x to y. 
23 
References 
[1] Bailey, Mart
.
in, (1978) "The Discount Rate for Envir1nm�nt
. 
1 Pr� .... 
Appendix C of "Costs and Benefits of CFM Contr 1,11 U iver�
. : II Maryland program for control of ozone depleti�1 · Jloh Cumfu
(director) for U.S. Environmental Protection Agenc�. Jame� 
ams," 
.y of 
land 
ibbs 
di rector) . j I : 
[2] Barry, Brian,
. 
(1977) "Justice Between Generations," in .La � Mei��lity, 
and Society, P.M.S. Hacker and J. R?Z (eds.), lar�ri on P�x;t$s, 
Oxford. 
[3] Baumol, William J. , (1968) "On the Social Rate of Dl'sco:uni," 
·American·Eceinomic·Review, Sept. 1968.
[4] Ferejohn, John and T. Page, 
_
"On the Foundations of ntert mpora 
Choice," American Jeillrna 1 of Agri cu 1tura1 Econ mi cl, May �lln8. 
[5] Freeman, Myrick, (1977) "Why We Should Discount Int rgehe atio� 
Effe<ts," FOtom, Vol. 9, No. 5, O<t. 1977. . I I
[6] Lind, Robert, (1964) "The Social Rate of Discount a d t�e Opti� Rate of Investment: Further Comment," Llarterl , · Jei�r al of
Economics, 78. I I II 
[7] Marglin, Stephen, (1963) "The Social Rate of Discou1t and the 0�1!ima1 
Rate of Investment," Quarterly Journal of Economick, 77.1 
[8] Sen, Amartya, (1961) "On Optimizing the Rate of saJingl" Econaw�c 
Joutna 1, LXXI , Sept. 1961. 
· I  [9] Sen, Amartya, (1967} "Isolation, Assurance, and the foc11·a·1 Ratt llll:lf 
Discount," Quarterly Journal Cif Economics, Vol. I 811 p. 1J:!ll-124. I 
24 
[10] Sen, Amartya, (1977), "ll.pproaches to the Choice of Discount Rates 
for Social Cost-Benefit Analysis," Resources for the Future 
conference "Energy Planning and the Social Rate of Discount," 
March 1977.
[11] Stig1itz, Joseph, "A Neoclassical Analysis of the Economics of 
Natural Resources," in Scarity and Growth Reconsidered 
V. K. Smith (ed), John Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1979.
25 
----
